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Abstract 
The neighborhood commons, and dog parks in particular, provide a good laboratory to explore the drivers 
of voluntarism and trust, as well as the situational and demographic correlates that promote or inhibit 
voluntarism. This analysis connects a central theme of Ostrom’s work on institutions for overcoming 
social dilemmas to the literature on voluntary actions and the health of small communities. Survey results 
from more than 500 users of 14 dog parks in the Atlanta area are examined to understand how variation in 
park and user characteristics predict variation in individual contributions to the commons, including pro-
social attitudes and behavior and dispute resolution behavior. Our analysis shows how institutions foster 
community commons, which are correlated with both voluntarism and the voluntary enforcement of 
norms on users. These results from a study in the field contribute to a growing literature that explores the 
circumstances for successful voluntary supply and maintenance of public goods. 
Keywords: dog parks, new commons, voluntarism, philanthropy, reciprocity, community, monitoring and 
sanctioning, institutional analysis 
Introduction 
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Elinor Ostrom’s work has spawned a vast literature that catalogues numerous instances where 
nongovernmental or voluntary institutions were developed to govern commons and mitigate social 
problems, such as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). Although privatization or centralized 
government control traditionally has been advocated to avoid commons dilemmas, Ostrom argued that 
individuals in local communities have great aptitude for finding creative solutions to commons dilemmas 
that overcome free-riding. Often, these creative (nonprivatized and nongovernmental) solutions involve 
institutions relying on volunteers. We use field evidence from more than 500 users of 14 off-leash dog 
parks to generate positive theory regarding the institutional, community, and individual drivers of 
voluntarism, social capital, and pro-social attitudes and behavior. In addition, we leverage these data to 
understand how individuals interact with the community around them to contribute to the maintenance of 
the commons. 
Empirical evidence from the field and lab settings suggests that individuals self-organize to 
create, manage, and protect natural resources and other organizations (Ostrom, 2000). In many cases, 
averting the tragedy—in consuming or maintaining the commons—depends on at least some users 
volunteering or acting with broader social interests in mind. One of Ostrom’s key findings is that people 
do not free-ride or act as selfishly as much as the rational actor model would predict. Individuals 
frequently exhibit pro-social or altruistic behavior. They are willing to sacrifice for “greater good” and 
often volunteer rather than free-ride (Simon, 1993). Although the circumstances that lead individuals to 
voluntarily contribute, monitor, and enforce rules to maintain a resource are not well understood (Ostrom, 
2000), evidence from lab settings points to trust building from communication (Janssen, Holahan, Lee, & 
Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom & Walker, 2005) and social preferences that lead to conforming behavior or the 
“desire to do the right thing.” Perceptions of fairness and the establishment of governance rules by 
resource users allow for improved outcomes, whereas allowing costly punishment improves outcomes in 
the short term but degrades outcomes in the long run (Janssen et al., 2010). 
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Bridging the gap between voluntarism and the common goods approach, Lohmann (1989) notes 
that the rational actor model of economics is inappropriate for assessing the provision of a broad range of 
nonprofit activities and that the commons is characterized by uncoerced participation, shared purposes 
and resources, mutuality, and fairness (Lohmann, 1992; Lohmann & Van Til, 1992). Nevertheless, the 
circumstances that give rise to voluntarism and trust, key ingredients in successful common-pool resource 
(CPR) regimes, are not well understood. Better understanding the circumstances that promote pro-social 
behavior and support sustainable and voluntary provision of a public resource hold lessons for voluntary 
sector studies. 
Neighborhood commons, and dog parks in particular, provide a good laboratory to explore the 
correlates of voluntarism and trust, including situational and demographic factors. We examine variation 
in park and user characteristics that predict variation in individual contribution to the commons, including 
pro-social attitudes and behavior, “quasi-voluntary cooperation” (Levi, 1989) (whether rules are enforced 
and followed by users), and dispute resolution behavior. Although there have been numerous studies that 
summarize empirical evidence relating to determinants of successful commons management (Ostrom, 
2005), off-leash areas provide a rich field setting in which to observe different types of rules, management 
arrangements, and how these relate to quasi-voluntary cooperation. Of particular interest is evidence from 
a field setting of factors giving rise to individuals making real sacrifices for a collective good. 
In this article, we first explore the individual, institutional, and contextual correlates of a sense of 
community and, in turn, the relationship between the sense of community and outcomes related to 
voluntarism and philanthropy. This offers new evidence about where to find pro-social behaviors in the 
field. We then explore the role that these individual, institutional, and contextual attributes have in 
voluntary conflict resolution efforts in the commons. These results underscore the importance of 
voluntary rule and norm enforcement in maintaining institutions (beyond donations of time and money). 
Literature Review 
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Generation of Pro-Social Behaviors 
Pro-social actions and attitudes follow from individual, institutional, and contextual attributes of 
communities. Grønbjerg and Paarlberg (2001) demonstrate that the nonprofit sector and the effort to 
address social dilemmas are a function of the institutional and contextual environment in which nonprofits 
operate. Similarly, Wilson (2012) and Torgerson and Edwards (2013) find that variation in individual and 
community attributes are important drivers in promoting voluntarism. In contrast, Wakefield, Elliott, 
Eyles, and Cole (2006) find that social interaction, networks, and embeddedness in a community are more 
important and consistent predictors of pro-social behavior than demographic or neighborhood 
characteristics. Feeling a sense of community contributes to social capital and provides solidarity benefits 
to individuals (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Existing research highlights the role that social capital plays in 
fostering voluntarism and philanthropy (Brown & Ferris, 2007) and in pro-environmental behavior 
(Jones, Sophoulis, Iosifides, Botetzagias, & Evangelinos, 2009). 
Although the relationship between social capital and voluntarism is complex and likely bi-
directional (Foley & Edwards, 1999), we expect that feeling a sense of community is generated by 
institutional characteristics and a precursor of more concrete behaviors such as voluntarism and 
philanthropy. To explore this hypothesis, we explore the role of individual, institutional, and contextual 
characteristics in fostering a sense of community and, in turn, the role of community in promoting 
voluntarism and financial contributions to maintain a local resource. 
Most dog parks rely on volunteer labor. Many also rely on financial contributions from the 
community. Volunteering time or money does not capture all pro-social behavior alternatives, but they are 
two important components of the maintenance of the resource. These are behavioral metrics of 
voluntarism rather than attitudes, although our survey ultimately relies on self-reported voluntary 
contributions. 
Quasi-Voluntary Behavior and Enforcement of Rules and Norms 
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Although it is clear that establishing community, communication, and social capital help maintain 
institutions, the relationship between monitoring and sanctioning is less clear. Off-leash parks exist under 
the radar or (for unofficial parks) outside the scope of conventional law enforcement. Yet, they rely on 
rules and enforcement for sustainability (Matisoff & Noonan, 2012), and some parks’ rules are rather 
evolved even if informal. Furthermore, compliance with and enforcement of rules is essentially voluntary; 
should there be sharp increases in non-compliance, the coercive apparatus (or lack thereof) would likely 
be inadequate. In a sense, users of the local commons have the responsibility to monitor those resources 
and enforce rules. This costly behavior is a type of voluntarism that has enormous implications for the 
perseveration of social norms and solving the second-order dilemma of institutional maintenance 
(Ostrom, 1990). 
Levi (1989) notes that in situations where compliance with rules is generally high, the overall 
costs of monitoring and sanctioning are low and the effectiveness of sanctioning and monitoring efforts is 
high. She terms this state “quasi-voluntary compliance.” Whereas Levi assumes the coercive power of a 
ruler to ultimately enforce laws, we examine the ability of public space users to self-govern and engage in 
costly (to the individual user) monitoring and enforcement efforts that ultimately lead to a state of quasi-
voluntary compliance. That is, we view compliance with the rules of off-leash areas as quasi-voluntary, 
with periodic enforcement of rules and norms by the users of the resource. Dog parks offer a great 
opportunity to examine voluntary enforcement activity in the field and not in contrived lab settings. 
Robust commons regimes often rely on volunteers for monitoring, enforcement, and other maintenance, 
and dog parks appear to be no different. 
Institutional economics suggests rational decision making, monitoring, and enforcement of 
institutional rules are crucial for the maintenance of the resource and the survival of an institution (North, 
1990). Evidence from the field suggests that monitoring and sanctioning may be crucial elements of an 
institution’s design (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). And, lab settings provide substantial evidence that 
individuals will engage in costly punishment that does not align with game-theoretical expectations 
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(Carpenter, 2007; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005). Previous research in the local commons suggests that 
sanctioning may have a damaging impact on philanthropy and voluntarism (Matisoff & Noonan, 2012). 
We term behavior pertaining to the resolution of disputes as “conflict-related” behavior. Whereas 
conflicts between users are undesirable, some amount of proactive user enforcement of rules, or action to 
avoid or resolve conflict, is likely necessary to maintain the commons. We examine five metrics of 
conflict-related behavior. Two types of behavior involve an individual unilaterally avoiding conflict by 
moving to another part of the park or by leaving. Two types of behavior are more enforcement oriented: 
Users ask other users to change behavior, pick up feces, and so forth; or, to leave the park. Finally, we 
examine rare cases where users call upon third-party security agents to intervene. 
Data and Method 
General Approach 
Variation across parks allows us to connect the institutional design of off-leash areas with the 
formation of social capital and examine how institutional rules may facilitate trust, mutuality, and 
voluntarism while controlling for the institutional setting and demographic characteristics of users (Isham, 
Kolodinsky, & Kimberly, 2006). Furthermore, because all institutions are nested within the Atlanta 
region, we control for the broader institutional context that might drive trust, mutuality, and voluntarism. 
Off-leash areas exhibit institutional diversity. Matisoff and Noonan (2012) provide a more 
complete discussion on the alignment between park types and CPR theory. Depending on the institutional 
rules and level of crowding at dog parks, they may resemble pure public goods, CPRs, club goods, or 
private goods. Some parks are sanctioned and have a list of official rules. Others are informal (and 
illegal). Some are private—operated by a housing complex, a development corporation, or a coffee shop. 
Off-leash areas have unique institutional arrangements such as a local rules-in-use that restrict use to 
members of a specific community, making them akin to club goods. Even as club goods, dog parks face a 
shirking problem (Prakash & Potoski, 2007) as users can cheat the rules or free-ride on others’ 
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enforcement. Regardless, all dog parks in this study have some degree of local rules, maintained by the 
users, which reflect collective efforts to provide an institutional response to dog park management. Table 
1 lists Ostrom’s design principles and how these apply to dog parks. 
We test correlates of pro-social attitudes by predicting users’ sense of community with individual, 
institutional, and neighborhood variables. We then explain pro-social behavior (voluntarism and 
philanthropy) by employing this sense of community as a predictor. Finally, we examine users’ unilateral 
efforts to employ various strategies to monitor and enforce rules and norms. Figure 1 diagrams our model. 
This approach helps explain the evolution of social norms, quasi-voluntary behavior, voluntarism, and 
self-monitoring and enforcement of formal and informal rules, bringing new empirical evidence on the 
correlates of voluntarism to the voluntary behavior literature from a distinctly Ostrom-esque perspective. 
Atlanta-Region Dog Parks and Survey Administration 
In recent years, dog parks have been the fastest growing type of park in urban United States (El 
Nasser, 2011). There are more than 575 municipal-designated dog parks in the 100 largest U.S. cities 
(Trust for Public Land, 2012). Atlanta has only three public municipal-designated dog parks. By 
comparison, Portland, Oregon, has a similar population and 32 dog parks. In Atlanta, creating and 
maintaining dog parks is a “grass-roots operation.” Groups of dog owners must organize themselves and 
go through a formal process of proposing a dog park to not only the City of Atlanta but also civic and 
neighborhood planning associations in a given area. Dog parks in Atlanta must be at least two acres in 
size, fenced with controlled entrances and exits for separate small and large dog areas, be serviced by 
drinking water, be properly developed and maintained, and post dog park rules (City of Atlanta, 2013). 
Other cities in the Atlanta region have similar designation and maintenance requirements, and some dog 
parks, such as those in Decatur, Georgia, are restricted to only local residents. 
We identified seven municipal-designated dog parks, including three dog parks in Atlanta, three 
dog parks in Decatur, and one dog park in Kennesaw. To obtain greater variation in dog park institutional 
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contexts, we expanded our search for other types of dog parks. We canvassed neighborhoods, inquired 
with dog owners, and searched Internet sites popular with dog owners, including Yelp.com, 
Bringfido.com, and Doggoes.com. We identified 18 additional off-leash dog areas for a total of 25 dog 
parks. This list includes all of the municipal-designated parks in Atlanta and nearby suburbs in addition to 
the most popular private dog parks and unofficial dog parks. 
Five hundred ten completed surveys were collected from users at 14 different off-leash dog areas. 
Survey response rate was greater than 90%. We were not able to gain access to several of the residential 
association dog parks or get permission to sample at a private dog “club” in suburban Alpharetta. The 
final list and description of the dog parks where surveys were collected are available upon request. 
Demographic data drawn from the American Community Survey 5-year averages (2008-2012) are 
matched to each dog park based on the Census block group hosting the park (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
Method 
We employ multivariate regression and random-effects specifications to leverage variation within 
and across dog parks. We estimate the model in Figure 1 via ordinary least squares for pro-social attitudes 
and behaviors and via probits for conflict-related behavior to identify the impact of the same vectors of 
individual, institutional, and neighborhood characteristics on pro-social attitudes and voluntary behaviors. 
Table 2 summarizes the variables used here. Modeling pro-social attitudes and behaviors helps us 
understand mutuality, reciprocity, and quasi-voluntary behavior. We acknowledge trade-offs in measuring 
pro-social attitudes and behaviors with a limited set of responses. Although these metrics align closely 
with concepts of interest and allow a parsimonious approach to testing relationships, these complex 
concepts are worth unpacking in future research. Ostrom (2000) establishes that individual initiatives to 
maintain the commons, punish other users, and enforce rules are characteristics of mutuality and 
reciprocity. 
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In addition to individual user characteristics, we measure park characteristics, whether a user 
contributes or volunteers to help maintain the parks, and user perceptions of institutional management 
characteristics that align with Ostrom’s (1990) eight principles of robust CPR management (see Table 1). 
These principles are translated into a series of Likert-type scale questions (1-7) that measured users’ 
perception of the institutional management of dog parks. For example, users were asked the extent to 
which they agreed with the statements: “I hold other dog park users accountable for observance of the 
rules” and “The physical conditions of this dog park are well maintained.” These questions align with 
Ostrom principle 4: “regular monitoring of users and resource conditions.” A copy of the complete survey 
instrument is available from the authors. Institutional characteristics such as whether the park is public or 
private, and whether it is an official park or unofficial park were coded by the survey administrators. 
Neighborhood characteristics are measured based on the Census block groups containing the dog parks. 
Results 
Pro-Social Behaviors 
Demographic characteristics 
Demographic characteristics of individuals demonstrate that women are more likely to volunteer 
to maintain the local commons. Older individuals are more likely to volunteer and to donate money. 
Education is unrelated to any pro-social outcome. Wealthier individuals feel a stronger sense of 
community, but are not likely to contribute more money or volunteer time. Those with children are 
somewhat more likely to report volunteering. Frequent users of the park are more likely to feel a greater 
sense of community, volunteer, and contribute financial resources to the maintenance of the park. Those 
who use the park to meet friends also report stronger senses of community, more volunteering, and more 
donating money. Interestingly, those who use the park as a place to meet new people also report feeling a 
greater sense of community but are somewhat less likely to contribute financially to maintain the park and 
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are significantly more apt to volunteer. These results highlight that social interaction at the park and 
history of repeated use are correlated with a sense of community and contributions to the park’s upkeep. 
Institutional management perceptions 
Beyond predictors of a stronger sense of community as an arguably worthy goal in its own right, 
we observe sense of community as a strong correlate of user voluntarism and financial contributions. This 
result emphasizes that the solidarity benefits of nonprofits (or other voluntary associations) are associated 
with the upkeep of a resource. Other indicators of institutional management prove to be important 
predictors of generating community and the upkeep of the park through voluntarism and charity. Users 
who report the park as well maintained are much more likely to report a strong sense of community but 
are not more or less likely to contribute to upkeep, suggesting that having a well-maintained resource is 
important to facilitate bonding but may inspire as much free-riding as willingness to pitch in. 
In contrast, users who perceive they have greater input into rules report more volunteering or 
contributing money. The causal arrow likely points both ways. These individuals’ contributions may 
“buy” them input into rules. It is also possible that perceiving input into rules provides users of a feeling 
of ownership and motivation to help upkeep the park. Interestingly, users who report abiding by rules are 
much less likely to volunteer. It seems possible that adhering to rules is a substitute for volunteering time 
or, in a sense, being a good citizen exempts users from extra duty. 
Across all three models in Table 3, users who hold other users accountable report stronger 
agreement with a sense of community and pro-social behaviors. It seems likely that those who hold other 
users accountable tend to feel greater ownership of the resource and, thus, feel a sense of community and 
contribute to its upkeep. Conversely, the presence of mechanisms to resolve conflicts is not positively 
correlated with pro-social behaviors. This reflects the ambiguity in the relationship between the upkeep of 
a resource and dispute resolution, monitoring, and sanctioning. 
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Park types matter significantly. Unofficial parks, which lack fences or listed rules, score much 
higher along the sense of community dimension. This result suggests that users of unofficial parks 
substitute a sense of community as a mechanism for park maintenance and rely on establishing informal 
institutional rules and norms to replace the role of government or a more formal provider of the resource. 
Users of unofficial dog parks report less formal volunteering than at official dog parks, perhaps because 
investing time building or maintaining facilities, for instance, is impermissible at unofficial dog parks. 
(These parks—or uses of existing parks—are in fact illegal.) Official dog parks, conversely, typically 
receive little or no maintenance from the city and rely on volunteer labor. (Often, official dog parks are 
approved only after petitioners commit to self-maintenance of the grounds, which allows resource-
strapped parks departments to shift resources elsewhere.) This finding emphasizes the effectiveness of 
self-organizing and creating self-sustaining institutions, formal or informal, to provide resources. 
Similarly, private parks—those operated by an apartment complex or dining establishment—are 
also able to generate a sense of community that exceeds official and unofficial public parks. Private, for-
profit owners succeed in engendering community. These parks do not rely on user voluntarism—perhaps 
as the private property owner is seen as responsible for the labor to maintain these resources. In contrast, 
users of these resources are much more likely to contribute financially to maintain these resources 
(including through their rent or restaurant bill). This result highlights the trade-off between a public 
resource relying on voluntarism and a private resource relying on fees for upkeep. 
Small parks seem less able to generate a sense of community, while one of the two large parks 
also scored poorly along sense of community. Users at both large parks exhibited less voluntarism. In the 
context of nonprofit institutions and the provision of local public goods, this suggests that goods must be 
scaled to an appropriate size to generate a sense of community that leads to solidarity benefits and not so 
large as to lead to free-riding. Large and small parks appear equally adept at eliciting financial 
contributions in this sample, with Piedmont Park (which had recently raised funds from users to finance 
upgraded facilities) an exception. 
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Neighborhood characteristics 
We control for neighborhood median household income and the percent of the neighborhood 
households who are renters. We find no relationship between pro-social behaviors and income levels of 
the host neighborhood. Socioeconomic attributes of users might affect pro-social behavior, but the 
socioeconomics of neighbors explains little here. However, we find that when a park is in a higher rental 
area, users report less of a sense of community. This may be due to more transitory residents and users, 
and shallower social connections among them. These results, again, underscore importance of social 
interaction driving community. 
Conflict-Related Behavior and the Maintenance of the Commons 
The survey elicited five alternative conflict response behaviors, which range from passive 
avoidance to active interventions, including calling in authorities. Users moving or leaving the park due to 
conflict are bearing some personal cost to keep the peace, although they might not be improving or 
reinforcing good norms. Asking others to behave better, discipline their dog, or leave altogether also 
comes at some personal cost and risk in the conflict, although it might be vital to establishing or 
protecting park norms crucial to its sustainability. Across survey respondents, 45% report moving to 
avoid conflict, 27% report leaving to avoid conflict, 27% report asking others to move, 6% report asking 
others to leave, and 2% report calling security. Calling security is a particularly rare and extreme conflict 
response. This alternative stands in contrast with the other more voluntary and informal responses, 
demonstrated in Table 4. 
Results from regressions highlighting individuals’ conflict-related behavior allow us to 
understand the individual-level and institutional-level correlates of conflict avoidance and dispute 
resolution in a quasi-voluntary setting. Overall, Table 4 reveals several interesting patterns. High-
frequency visitors, users who perceive greater dog aggression problems, and those holding others 
accountable tended to be more likely to have undertaken the various conflict-related behaviors. Conflict 
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resolution options have fairly consistent predictors. Within the conflict avoidance behaviors (i.e., moved 
and left), however, other relationships are not so consistent. As the factors explaining the variation in 
moved differ from left, we see these are distinct alternative responses with different appeals for different 
people and situations. 
Individual and demographic characteristics 
Gender, age, education, and children are not consistent or strong predictors of conflict avoidance 
or more voluntary conflict resolution behavior. Older users, those without children, and those with more 
education are more likely to call security. Those users are not significantly more or less likely to employ 
the other conflict responses. 
Frequent visitors tend to engage in conflict avoidance and conflict resolution behavior. This 
strong result applies to all conflict response alternatives except asking others to leave. These users may 
feel more responsibility for park safety and authority to police “their” park, or benefit the most from an 
orderly and peaceful park, and thus, they tend to be proactive in conflict resolution. 
Those who come to meet new people are not more or less likely to engage in conflict avoidance 
behavior. In contrast, those who meet friends at the park are more likely to ask others to change behavior 
or to call security. Wealthier individuals are more likely to call security, but are not more likely to engage 
in other strategies. In wealthier neighborhoods, individuals are less likely to move to another part of the 
park, but are more likely to leave. They are also less likely to ask others to leave. 
Institutional characteristics and conflict-related behavior 
Unsurprisingly, users who perceive dog aggression as a problem are more likely to engage in all 
types of behavior. Users who believe that there are inadequate mechanisms to resolve conflict are more 
likely to move or leave, and are more likely to ask others to reform. These users do not perceive dispute 
resolution mechanisms as adequate and perhaps think the other two mechanisms are unavailable or too 
costly. Furthermore, users who believe that the rules of the park are clear are less likely to engage in 
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conflict resolution behavior, especially asking others to change behavior. Those who report that they hold 
other users accountable for their actions, interestingly, tend to avoid conflict or ask others to change their 
or their pet’s behavior; they may not be more likely to ask others to leave or to call security. Those 
policing the park may not need actual police. 
Users who perceive a strong sense of community at the park are more likely to ask other users to 
change behavior or leave, but are not more likely to move or leave themselves. Where a strong sense of 
community exists, users are more likely to unilaterally enforce rules and engage in costly punishment or 
sanctioning behavior. This sense of belonging leads to removing offenders from the group, rather than 
oneself leaving or inviting in outside authorities. 
Interestingly, official dog parks, with fences and written rules, are no more or less likely to foster 
monitoring and sanctioning behavior. Private park users are more likely to ask others to leave in case of 
conflict. Because users pay for these parks, they might tend to feel entitled to ask others to bear the costs 
of restoring order. The entrance fee might also essentially screen for users more committed to actively 
enforce and overcome free-riding (Iannaccone, 1992). 
Park size does not have a strong relationship with conflict resolution behavior. The two largest 
parks show disparate tendencies associated with conflict resolution. Piedmont Park users are less likely to 
leave in case of conflict. Swift-Cantrell Park users are less likely to move to another part of the park but 
are more likely to leave. They are also less likely to ask other users to reform or leave. These findings 
may be due to the particular layout characteristics of those parks. 
Neighborhood characteristics 
In areas with a higher renter population, users are less likely to move to another part of the park 
but are more likely to leave. They are less likely to ask others to change behavior or leave. Another way 
of interpreting this is that users in areas with higher homeownership rates are more likely to ask other 
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users to change behavior or leave, and are less likely to leave themselves. This suggests a willingness to 
invest in a sort of “neighborhood watch” among homeowners in the neighborhood commons. 
Discussion 
Where to Find Pro-Social and Conflict-Related Behaviors 
Ostrom (1990) highlighted the problem of supplying institutions to govern resources such as dog 
parks and how solving that social dilemma to design robust institutions can yield successful commons 
management in a self-reinforcing system. Ostrom’s work frames commons management as crucially 
involving pro-social behavior and voluntary enforcement by users by involving participants in the 
generation and enforcement of institutional rules. Not all governance approaches enjoy the same success. 
Better understanding where individuals contribute more to the shared resource—via donations of time or 
money and via voluntary rule enforcement—remains an empirical challenge especially for “new 
commons.” Tables 3 and 4 illustrate some of these complex relationships. 
Because individuals likely choose which parks they visit based on a variety of characteristics 
(including the sense of community they feel at that particular park), and because self-reported voluntarism 
is difficult to disentangle from a sense of community, there is likely strong interdependence among our 
metrics. These relationships urge caution regarding the interpretation of statistical associations from our 
findings, but our results also emphasize the strength of the relationships among important institutional 
management concepts, such as the user perception into rules and holding other users accountable, and 
outcomes of the actions of individuals. Our findings are consistent with previous findings that community 
formation is a crucial correlate for pro-social behaviors and resource management. Empirically 
establishing the importance of community in relation to key institutional outcomes in the field is vital to 
advancing our understanding of how pro-social actions and quasi-voluntary compliance arise. 
Results suggest that a strong sense of community functions as a substitute for more formal 
sanctioning mechanisms and dog park rules. Unofficial parks score higher on sense of community and 
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contribute money, suggesting that users are able to self-organize, generate a sense of community, and 
provide local public goods, such as an off-leash area for dogs. However, because establishing official dog 
parks is largely driven by “grass-roots” mobilization of resources and support, unofficial dog parks may 
simply capture an earlier stage in the process. That is—a sense of community may breed the trust needed 
to collect financial donations, mobilize, and eventually establish an official dog park. This resource 
becomes used by a larger population—including those existing outside of the initial community—and 
users then report lower levels of community and financial contribution. 
Social interaction—through visit frequency, the desire to meet new people, the desire to make 
friends—appears to be the strongest correlate of feeling a sense of community. Higher homeownership 
rates are also correlated with this sense of community, suggesting that establishing a greater sense of 
permanence is associated with a sense of community that is correlated with these other behaviors. In a 
situation where users self-organize, those who have more permanent ties to the community may be 
instrumental at maintaining the type of social cohesion necessary to improve management at the park. 
Larger dog parks—and in particular the suburban park—are much less likely to be associated 
with a strong sense of community, again emphasizing that repeated social interaction is a key driver in 
community formation. Users who report a strong sense of community also report that they abide by rules 
of the park and hold other users accountable. 
It remains difficult to disentangle certain drivers of community from their effects. For example, 
users who perceive a strong sense of community are more likely to perceive that a park is well 
maintained. It is not clear if park maintenance is a prerequisite for community or, if a situation arises 
where community members are attempting to establish a park, they are more likely to believe that it is 
well maintained because they are more vested in the outcome. Users likely sort and “shop” among dog 
parks, further complicating matters, although we see sorting processes as further emphasizing users’ 
creation of community through their park selection and decisions about how to behave while there. 
Furthermore, because we rely on reported behavior and perceptions of voluntarism and philanthropy, our 
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measurements of voluntarism and philanthropy may not be the same as if there were independent 
observation of pro-social outcomes. 
Participating in Quasi-Voluntary Behavior 
We find that predictors of conflict resolution behavior at dog parks are a function of the 
perception of the problem, the attitudes and beliefs of the users, and the socioeconomic dynamics that 
surround the dog parks. Users who perceive dog aggression as a problem and inadequate rules or 
mechanisms to punish users are more likely to move or leave, ask others to reform or leave, or call 
security. Interestingly, we observe strong asymmetry in the perception between others’ not following 
rules and survey respondents’ self-perception of observing or following rules. Only 11 of 510 respondents 
disagreed with the statement that they abide by the rules. The strong dissonance between how users 
perceive their own behavior (following the rules nearly all of the time) and how they perceive others’ 
behavior (frequently breaking the rules) highlights a potential difficulty with self-governance and the 
potential inadequacy of informal mechanisms to resolve conflict. 
The institutional type conditions the voluntary conflict resolution behavior that results. Users in 
areas that are private are more likely to resolve conflict by asking others to leave. Users of areas that are 
“unofficial” are more likely to resolve conflict by unilaterally leaving the situation. These results suggest 
that dynamics involved with the private or voluntary (as opposed to government-sanctioned) enforcement 
of rules vary by institution. 
There are also park-specific factors. The suburban Swift-Cantrell Park was much less likely to 
have users move, ask others to change behavior, or ask others to leave. There were no cases where users 
called security, but users were much more likely to unilaterally leave in case of an incident. This park also 
had much lower indicators of “community,” emphasizing that when community ties are strong, there are 
different ways of resolving conflict. Because community is positively correlated with asking others to 
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leave, it appears that a strong community mentality at the dog park allows users to identify rule violators 
and asks them to leave. 
This dynamic of quasi-voluntary exclusion is likely controversial. It may be socially preferable 
and necessary to have users enforce rules and norms and ask others to leave when these rules and norms 
are not being observed. The number of renters in a neighborhood reinforces this perspective. In a 
neighborhood with more renters, users are much less likely to ask others to leave. The presence of a sense 
of community and the factors associated with that sense of community seem to be responsible for and 
consistent with the behavior demonstrated by individual users. This suggests that strong community 
norms, established by frequent park visits by users to the park, drive conflict resolution at the park. 
However, this voluntary enforcement dynamic may resemble vigilantism. There are obvious 
reasons why societies tend not to rely on voluntarism to maintain the rule of law. But this system of 
conflict resolution is not blind to park and neighborhood characteristics. The sense of community that 
allows for self-policing behavior and the enforcement of rules and norms is also sensitive to park and 
neighborhood characteristics. Very active users, those in neighborhoods with high homeownership rates, 
and users who worry about dog aggression employ both passive and active forms of conflict resolution. 
Those who take it upon themselves to create and sustain harmony in the neighborhood commons, 
interestingly, are not the same as those who call upon the authorities for order. The equity implications of 
quasi-voluntary behavior and the enforcement of social norms and rules deserve more attention in the 
future. 
Conclusion 
These results from a field setting highlight the role of social interaction, which in turn, is 
correlated with a sense of community and with both pro-social and conflict-related actions. Lab 
experiments have emphasized the importance of user efforts to establish and enforce the rules of the 
commons, generating a self-governing institution. These results from the field support these findings and 
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describe conditions where self-governance is more likely. Having a strong sense of community is related 
to increased voluntarism and to the unilateral enforcement of rules. Unofficial parks scored much more 
highly on sense of community, suggesting that a sense of community may substitute for the established 
rules. This dynamic was supported by discussions with users who acknowledged the need to self-police in 
the absence of an externally enforced set of rules. These results build nicely on Ostrom’s previous work 
about the critical role of voluntary, pro-social behavior in maintaining the commons. 
Social pressure, norms, and quasi-voluntary behavior are crucial components of a well-
functioning society. In addition to individual and contextual characteristics, institutional characteristics 
(and particularly the role of community) play fundamental roles in pro-social and conflict-related 
outcomes in this case, highlighting the relevance of Ostrom’s work for the nonprofit and voluntary studies 
community. 
The strong empirical associations of sense of community and other factors related to individuals’ 
ownership or stake in the park underscore the complex web of interdependence of institutional supply and 
voluntary compliance and enforcement emphasized by Ostrom (1990). Beyond describing who donates to 
their dog parks, we identify where users conduct more voluntary enforcement to help “supply the 
institution.” This evidence from the field reiterates a long-standing theme in Ostrom’s work: Voluntary, 
pro-social behavior is indeed possible in the face of a commons, but a second challenge in communities 
devising and maintaining a supporting institution must also be met. 
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Figure 1. Connecting voluntarism with user and contextual characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Ostrom’s Design Principles Applied to Dog Parks.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Variable Descriptions. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Impacts of Individual, Park, and Neighborhood Characteristics on Pro-Social 
Behavior. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Impacts of Individual and Park Characteristics on Conflict Resolution. 
 
 
 
